

# Emerging markets and the fear of the Fed

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Passion to Perform

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
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## The Fed is in unprecedented territory

#### Interest rates are at historically low levels...



#### ...and have been so for an extraordinarily long time

Start hiking cycle	Days since last hike					
March 84	•231 days					
January 85	•168 days					
July 85	•119 days					
April 86	•208 days					
May 86	•50 days					
January 87	•214 days					
August 87	•97 days					
March 88	•188 days					
February 94	•1724 days					
March 97	•783 days					
June 99	• 827 days					
June 04	•1506 days					
Today	•3193 days					
September FOMC	•3367 days					


Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research




## The Fed and markets view the world differently

#### ...market pricing is not consistent with Fed guidance






## Why we worry: the fear that Fed hikes trigger new EM crises




# We have been through a golden age for emerging markets during which the last Fed hiking cycle barely registered

Emerging markets offered an unprecedented growth premium over advanced economies in the last decade



This premium reached 5 percentage points prior to the global financial crisis




Source: Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook, Deutsche Bank Research

Source: Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook, Deutsche Bank Research

## Why did it happen?

Emerging markets have accounted for over threequarters of total global growth over the last 10 years




All the stars were aligned for emerging markets from the early part of the last decade onwards

- 1. The 'great moderation' which saw strong growth and low inflation in the US and elsewhere
- 2. The establishment of the single market in Europe
- 3. The widespread adoption of reforms following the emerging markets crises of the late-1990s
- 4. The emergence of China and its integration with the world economy
- 5. The super-cycle in global commodity prices
- 6. Favourable demographics
- 7. Monetary expansion by major central banks


Source: Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook, Deutsche Bank Research

## It resulted in an unprecedented increase in investment flows into emerging asset markets

Capital flows to EM expanded dramatically though their composition changed after the crisis



## Emerging markets have increasingly been able to finance themselves in their own currencies



Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research


Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

## The future for emerging markets will be more challenging

Many of the tailwinds that propelled emerging markets in the last decade have turned into headwinds

- 1. Growth in major markets may accelerate but is unlikely to return to pre-crisis levels
- 2. Demographics will turn less favourable, imminently for some countries like Russia
- 3. Commodity prices past their peak, partly due to China rebalancing
- 4. The cost of external financing will rise as the Fed and others eventually withdraw monetary stimulus
- 5. Growth models in many emerging market countries are past their 'sell-by' date
- 6. A multi-year dollar upswing will present challenges for some EMs


#### Demographics is one example of this




Source: Haver Analytics, United Nations, Deutsche Bank Research

# While EM faces a period of difficult adjustment, we think this will not translate into systemic crises of the kind we saw in previous decades

Better macroeconomic management has brought inflation more firmly under control




Government debt levels are significantly lower than in advanced economies



Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

## Currency pressure is much less of a threat to emerging markets than in the past...probably




Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

**Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research** 


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# Divergences in growth and monetary policy point towards a stronger dollar, which could in turn weigh on commodity prices

Rising differences in growth and nominal yields between the US and Europe point to dollar strength



## Commodity prices have tended to underperform in strong dollar environments




Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research



# Weaker commodity prices create some (mostly obvious) leaders and laggards among emerging markets


Weaker commodities would tend to favour much of Asia and EMEA over Latin America, where every country is to varying degrees a net commodity exporter



Source: UN Comtrade, Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

# Energy exporters face the most acute challenges: oil prices have weakened by much more than food and metal prices

Among the major EMs, Venezuela and Russia are the most exposed. India, Turkey, Hungary, Thailand, and Korea are the major beneficiaries




Source: UN Comtrade, Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research



## Have capital flows to emerging markets surged to such an extent that a sudden stop is now inevitable?

The current rate of capital flows to EM is not especially strong by recent standards...



Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research


Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

...this is true even in bond markets



# Stocks and flows: following years of inflows, however, foreigners now own a lot more EM debt than they did before the global financial crisis


Foreign ownership of privately held government debt has gone up by over 10 percent of recipient GDP on average




Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

### Another EM debt crisis?

#### External debt levels are still quite moderate...




#### ...though debt service indicators are a bit more mixed



Source: Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook, Deutsche Bank Research


Source: Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook, Deutsche Bank Research

# But there has been an increase in dollar debt issuance by the private sector in EM



The increase has been concentrated in companies and

...some of the increase in issuance has been through offshore affiliates of EM companies and banks.




Source: Haver Analytics, BIS, Deutsche Bank Research

Source: Haver Analytics, BIS, Deutsche Bank Research



# In Turkey, the increase in corporate dollar funding has been intermediated through local banks



Turkish companies have substantial FX liabilities...

Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Deutsche Bank Research


Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Deutsche Bank Research

...and relatively little is naturally hedged


Deutsche Bank

# Emerging markets that are either highly reliant on external funding or heavily levered are potentially vulnerable to higher US rates

During "Taper Tantrum 1.0", markets focused on a handful of EMs with large external deficits...




...though not so much on countries with large and/or rapidly growing private debt levels



Source: Haver Analytics, BIS, Deutsche Bank Research

## Some of the more fragile EMs have made progress in adjusting over. But this process is incomplete.


FX valuation in the so-called fragile five emerging markets has improved since the taper tantrum



\* Average of behavioural equilibrium exchange rate and productivity adjusted PPP exchange rate

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

Current account adjustment on the other hand has lagged, with the notable exception of India





## EM Vulnerability Assessment confirms high risks in Ukraine, Venezuela and Argentina

	Growth -	Inflation	Credit growth	Private debt	Real rates	Current account	Reserve cover	FX valuation	Public debt	Fiscal balance	Overall			
	Z-score	YoY%	Excess %	% GDP	%	% GDP	% GEFR	%	% GDP	% GDP	Percentile	UKR	<u> </u>	
UKR	-1.18	22.2	12.0	69.2	-14.0	-4.7	26.7	-32.3	67.6	-5.8	0.80	VEN		
VEN	-0.11	63.8	28.5	36.3	-29.9	1.2	110.2	103.0	35.6	-14.2	0.72			_
ARG	-0.36	42.6	0.3	14.5	-15.6	-0.9	97.5	30.1	48.9	-4.5	0.69	ARG		_
HKG	-0.05	5.2	11.0	330.8	-4.5	2.7	35.0	11.3	6.5	2.6	0.62	HKG		-
TUR	-0.57	8.8	11.4	58.6	1.1	-5.8	73.6	-3.6	33.6	-2.0	0.62	TUR		
ZAF	-0.18	5.8	0.7	74.8	0.2	-5.6	95.9	-13.0	47.9	-4.9	0.61	ZAF		·
SGP	-0.93	-0.2	6.9	135.0	0.6	19.4	24.3	7.0	103.1	4.3	0.59	SGP		
BRZ	-1.03	6.5	4.3	74.3	4.4	-4.0	259.6	-5.4	65.8	-3.9	0.58	BRZ		
IND	-0.93	4.8	0.9	56.6	3.8	-1.3	291.3	0.8	60.5	-7.2	0.56	IND		
MEX	0.33	4.2	7.9	45.2	-0.9	-2.0	151.2	-3.2	48.0	-4.2	0.56	MEX		
THA	-0.69	1.1	3.7	134.8	1.1	3.6	264.2	6.6	47.9	-2.5	0.53	THA		
CHL	-0.85	5.3	2.7	79.0	-2.1	-1.9	171.6	-12.5	13.9	-1.8	0.53	CHL		
CHN	-1.82	1.6	5.4	139.4	2.8	2.0	548.4	9.8	40.7	-1.0	0.50	CHN		
MAL	-0.07	2.9	1.7	124.9	0.8	5.5	104.3	-6.0	56.6	-3.6	0.49	MAL	1	
CZE	-0.13	0.5	0.6	54.8	-0.1	0.2	109.0	-2.3	44.4	-1.2	0.46	CZE		
ISR	-0.42	-0.2	0.0	115.5	0.4	3.7	241.7	-4.9	67.4	-2.9	0.44	ISR		
IDN	-0.05	6.5	3.9	34.3	0.9	-2.9	153.5	-4.5	26.2	-2.5	0.44	IDN		
PER	-0.63	3.0	8.5	33.3	1.4	-4.6	376.0	-1.1	19.3	-0.1	0.42	PER		
COL	-0.02	3.3	5.0	43.1	0.9	-4.2	165.9	-17.2	34.0	-1.5	0.42	COL		
RUS	-0.95	9.6	9.8	55.4	3.1	2.6	527.1	-30.2	15.7	-0.9	0.41	RUS		
POL	-0.26	-0.4	1.8	51.9	2.4	-1.3	202.4	-6.7	49.4	-3.2	0.40	POL		
KOR	-0.34	1.0	0.4	160.7	1.1	6.2	293.7	4.5	35.4	0.3	0.40	KOR		
PHL	0.49	3.6	7.2	46.4	-1.9	3.6	838.9	2.3	36.3	-0.3	0.39	PHL		
TWN	0.14	0.8	1.2	142.3	0.0	12.3	237.3	-2.8	39.9	-2.3	0.38	TWN		
ROM	-0.25	1.3	-8.6	32.6	0.5	-0.5	176.5	-12.3	39.9	-2.2	0.33	ROM		
HUN	0.05	-0.7	-8.8	42.7	2.8	4.1	198.5	-4.6	79.1	-2.9	0.30	HUN		
		-0.7	-0.0	42.1	2.0	4.1	190.0	-4.0	19.1	-2.9	0.30	0.3	0.5	-

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research

# Our vulnerability heat map points to a reduction in risks in Central Europe, India, and Indonesia; but rising risks in Latin America



Source: Deutsche Bank Research

#### Deutsche Bank

# Good macro management has never been enough: structural policies also matter and this will become increasingly apparent.

	Institutional			Financial	Economic	Goods	State	Labour		-2.0	0.0 2.0
	quality	Infrastructure	Education	market	openness	market	intervention	market	Overall	_	0.0 2.0
SGP	1.69		2.76	1.58	1.81	1.69	0.91	0.54	1.70	SGP	
HKG	1.55		1.28	1.84	-0.24	1.30	0.91	0.67	1.28	HKG	_
TWN	1.03		2.27	0.47	-0.17	1.09	0.84	0.50	0.99	TW N	
MAL	0.28		0.91	1.11	-0.19	1.29	0.20	0.46	0.67	MAL	
KOR	0.76		1.83	-0.89	-0.30	0.23	0.58	0.59	0.60	KOR	
CHL	1.29		0.33	0.32	0.04	0.49	0.34	0.04	0.44	CHL	
CHN	-0.92		0.48		0.63	-0.23		2.66	0.38	CHN	
ISR	0.60		0.92	0.29	-0.33	-0.20	-0.67	-0.12	0.19	ISR	
THA	-0.56		-0.26	0.04	0.06	-0.03	0.70	0.85	0.18	THA	
POL	0.87		0.90	-0.05	0.75	-0.06	-1.25	-0.17	0.13	POL	)
IDN	-0.61		0.33	-0.52	0.19	0.07	0.72	0.44	0.11	IDN	)
PER	-0.48		-0.76	-0.11	1.29	-0.05	0.90	0.38	0.09	PER	
IND	-0.58		-0.44	0.32	0.38	-0.21	0.47	0.73	0.05	IND	
CZE	0.90		0.53	-0.49	0.54	-0.29	-2.05	0.06	0.00	CZE	
TUR	-0.29		0.20	-0.23	0.20	0.37	-0.88	0.10	0.00	TUR	]
ZAF	0.12		-1.35	1.56	0.30	0.72		-2.05	-0.07	ZAF	]
PHL	-0.56		-0.29	-0.22	-0.27	-0.72		0.26	-0.15	PHL	1
HUN	0.64		0.56	-0.84	0.34	-0.35	-1.93	-0.50	-0.20	HUN	1
MEX	-0.36		-0.37	-0.50	-0.25	-0.52		-0.06	-0.21	MEX	1
ROM	0.00		-0.27	-0.80	0.60	-0.62	-0.62	0.31	-0.25	ROM	
RUS	-1.09		0.48	-1.53	0.18	-0.90	-1.11	0.56	-0.33	RUS	
BRZ	-0.20	0.11	-0.49	-0.23	-0.02	-1.10	-0.82	-0.03	-0.35	BRZ	
COL	-0.56		-0.52	-0.64	0.20	-0.85	-0.02	-0.26	-0.38	COL	
UKR	-1.07	0.16	0.69	-1.44	0.51	-1.19	-1.90	0.22	-0.50	UKR	
ARG	-0.60	-0.41	0.44	-1.96	-0.36	-2.25	-0.26	0.19	-0.65	ARG	
VEN	-1.81	-1.34	-0.43	-2.05	-0.41	-2.61	-1.00	-0.09	-1.22	VEN	
A sia average	0.21	1.14	0.89	0.34	0.19	0.45	0.66	0.77	0.58		-
EMEA average	0.08	0.38	0.30	-0.39	0.34	-0.28	-1.17	-0.18	-0.11		
LatAm average	-0.39		-0.26	-0.74	0.07	-0.98	-0.10	0.03	-0.33		
EM average	0.00	0.51	0.37	-0.20	0.21	-0.19	-0.18	0.24	0.10		

Source: Deutsche Bank Research

value >= 0.15 value >-0.15 and <0.15 value <=-0.15

Values are normalized such that zero represents that average for EM in 2007

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
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...and little progress in diversifying economic activity

away from the oil and gas sector

Source: Haver Analytics. Deutsche Bank Research

# The structural reform process in Russia has stalled and may swing into reverse if the government pursues a more inward-looking strategy



Russia has made little progress reducing the role of the state in the economy....

Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research


Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research

## The failure to address long-standing structural weaknesses has undermined South African economic performance

## A toxic combination of poor labour relations and a weak education...

...and a failure to invest in critical infrastructure at an early stage


## ...has hit exports despite a much weaker rand






# Turkey is a little unusual insofar as its problems are as much macroeconomic as structural in nature

Turkey has yet to bring inflation firmly under control...



Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank Research


...contributing to low private saving, chronic reliance on foreign saving, and a tendency to boom-bust cycles



Source: Haver Analytics, Deutsche Bank



Combining our macroeconomic and structural assessments helps to identify countries that could struggle in a rising rate environment



## Conclusions

- The normalization of US monetary policy will represent a key stress test for emerging markets
- Market pricing suggests the process could be a benign one, characterized by very gradual increases, a low terminal rate, and offsetting flows from the ECB
- This could provide policymakers within EM additional time to adjust
- We continue to think a systemic EM crisis remains unlikely, reflecting the buffers put in place over the past 10-15 years
- But even a benign US hiking cycle could present challenges where there have been rapid increases in leverage, especially if funded in dollars
- The days in which emerging markets collectively under- or over-performed are likely behind us: we expect greater divergence in performance
- It will ultimately be the quality of economic policymaking within EM structural as much as macroeconomic – that will drive this performance

## End



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