

International Monetary Fund



Global Financial Stability Report October 2020

Fabio M Natalucci

Deputy Director Monetary and Capital Markets Department

JVI Webinar: Key Global and European Risks to Financial Stability





Unprecedented policy support has:

- > Kept markets functioning
- Maintained the flow of credit
- Avoided adverse macro-financial feedback loops...
- …and widespread bankruptcies



A Bridge to Recovery

but may exacerbate future vulnerabilities:

- Real-financial disconnect
- Rising debt and insolvencies

Depletion of bank buffers


Excessive risk-taking



Financial Conditions Have Remained Accommodative

Global Financial Conditions Indices (Standard deviations from mean) 6 Tightening April United 2020 5 States GFSR 4 Euro 3 area 2 Other China advanced economies 0 -1 Other emerging market economies -2 -3 20 07 09 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 80 10 14 11


Key Drivers of Global Financial Conditions Indices (Standard deviations from mean)




The Flow of Credit To the Economy Has Been Maintained

AE Corporate Bond and Leverage Loan Issuance EM Corporate and Sovereign Bond Issuance


(Billions of US dollars)




Bank Credit Growth in AEs and EMs, 2020:Q2 (Percent)



Risk of EM Outflows Has Declined; EM Local Markets Have Stabilized






Note: "**APP economies**" refer to countries where the central bank deployed asset purchase programs




Global Financial Stability Risks Have been Contained




(Probability Densities)












The Real-Financial Disconnect Persists






Strong Rebound Has Led to Stretched Valuations in Equity Markets...

S&P500: Decomposition of Equity Market Performance (Percent contribution to cumulative returns)



Global Stock Markets Performance (Indices; 2/19/20=100)







From "whatever it takes" today...

More liquidity support today...

- \bullet

... solvency risks shift into the future Liquidity extended to nonviable firms

- \bullet
- Debt overhang \bullet

...to phasing out extraordinary policy support


Collapse in revenues led firms to increase borrowing Liquidity support kept bankruptcies at bay Impact uneven across countries and sectors

Misallocation of resources



Increased borrowing has pushed corporate debt levels to new highs in several countries






Vulnerabilities are Rising Across Countries and Sectors'

Firms in sectors most affected by the pandemic have seen higher default rates

Global Speculative Grade Corporate Default Rates (12-Month Trailing, Percent)






... As Asset Quality of Risky Credits Has Weakened

Interest coverage ratios have dropped sharply, especially in the loan market

Default forecasts have risen but the forecast dispersion is high

Median Interest Coverage Ratio for **US High-Yield and Leveraged Loan** Issuers (EBITDA-to-Interest Expense)

US Speculative-Grade Default Rate: Actual and Forecasts by Credit Rating Agencies (Trailing 12-month rate, percent)



... including in risky credit markets

Implied Correlations from North **American CDX HY**

(between default rates of synthetic CDS) tranches)









From "whatever it takes" today...

Greater use of buffers by banks today...

- •

....to phasing out extraordinary policy support


... less capacity to lend tomorrow

- capital & liquidity buffers may
 - leave banks vulnerable
 - and force them to scale back lending

Banks entered the crisis with strong capital & liquidity Borrower support policies and flexibility in regulatory frameworks have further supported bank lending


With low profitability & rising NPLs ahead, depletion of

Banks May Face Sizable Losses in the WEO Adverse Scenario



Sample: ~350 banks in 29 jurisdictions.

Note: The shortfall (RHS chart) is measured against bank-specific and fully loaded capital requirements, including a minimum CET1 of 4.5%, a GSIB buffer, a systemic risk buffer, a stress capital buffer, a conservation capital buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer.







Are Banks Beginning to Prepare for Tough Times Ahead?

New Loans, Credit Lines, and Government Guarantees, in **Major Advanced Economies, 2020**

(Billions of USD)





From "whatever it takes" today...


NBFIs entered crisis with elevated vulnerabilities...

- Significant fund outflows revealed... ... liquidity risks & maturity mismatches Public support prevented de-stabilizing blow ups
- lacksquare

... and risks remain elevated

- Fund inflows returned thanks to policy support
- Propelled by search-for-yield
- Investments into riskier credit and less liquid assets •


...to phasing out extraordinary policy support



Inflows Return to Investment Funds, but Vulnerabilities Remain Elevated

Cumulative Fund Flows

(Percent of assets under management)



Bid-Ask Spreads of Fixed-Income Funds' Portfolios (Percent)















Public Debt (percent of GDP)



Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor and IMF staff calculations.

Public Debt Is Risign Globally

Fiscal Deficit (percent of GDP)




Emerging and Frontier Markets Face Financing Challenges






Some Emerging Markets Face Financing Challenges

percent, right scale)



Funding Costs for Frontier Markets Are High; Some Lost Market Access


Hard Currency Bond Yields in Emerging and Frontier Markets (Percent)



External Debt-Service, through the End of 2021 (Share of foreign reserves, percent, as of July 2020)








Asset Purchase Programs in Emerging Market Economies






The need for emergency spending and the hit to revenues from the sharp economic shock of the **COVID-19 crisis increased budget deficits ...**



What's Different This Time?

... and most central banks have aggressively cut rates, some to all-time lows.








Emerging Market Policy Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Central banks have responded forcefully to the **COVID-19 crisis with an array of measures to boost** market liquidity and stabilize economic and financial conditions

Central Bank Policy Actions


(Number of central banks on y-axis; percent of sample in brackets)



... and for the first-time, number of emerging markets implemented asset purchase programs. These programs differ in scope, size, and duration from those in advanced economies

Central Bank Asset Purchases through August

(Percent of GDP)











Emerging market asset purchases rose significantly in March and April but have moderated recently



Central Bank Asset Purchases in Emerging Markets

... for some economies, the central bank purchases helped offset portfolio outflows during the crisis period

Change in Local Currency Government Bond Holdings, end-Feb–June 2020 (Percent of 2020 GDP)












APPs lowered bond yields and term premia, had little effect on currencies, and reduced market stress



A Consistent Message: APPs Have Been Effective



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




Vulnerabilities in Multiple Sectors; Policy Space Shrinking

Corporate, Bank, and Sovereign Vulnerabilities in the S29 Economies •

Note: Red dots denote countries with medium high to high sovereign vulnerabilities.



Higher corporate vulnerabilities

medium — medium-high





A Bridge to Recovery

