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Climate change economics



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Key concepts

- The asymmetry of countries' climate ambitions
- Carbon leakage
- Transition risks

Paris Agreement

- Bottom-up approach: no commitments, just (non-binding) nationally determined contributions
- Polycentric climate change regime: the major drivers of the regime are specific 'enthusiastic' countries, regions, municipalities, companies and financial institutions

The ambitions of climate policy differ dramatically across the world



Net zero targets by 2050

- Targets on net zero emissions adopted or discussed by 120 countries amounting to 49% of global GDP
- EU by 2050
- US by 2050
- Japan by 2050
- South Korea by 2050
- China by 2060





Carbon pricing in the world



Source: I4CE - Institute for Climate Economics with data from ICAP, World Bank, government officials and public information, May 2020.

Asymmetry of incentives

	'Reluctant' countries							
'Enthusiastic' countries	Have other development priorities	Significant emissions reduction puts the immediate economic model at risk						
EU countries	India	Russia						
United States	Brazil	Iran						
Japan	South Africa	Saudi Arabia						
China	Indonesia							
Australia	Mexico							
New Zealand								

Source: Author's Composition

Factor 1: Fossil fuel dependence

Fossil fuel rents (% of GDP) and fossil fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) in G20 countries



Source: made by the author based on World Bank data

Factor 2: Level of economic development

Energy related CO_2 -emissions in 1990-2019 гг.

Global energy-related CO₂ emissions by 2050



Source: BP, EIA

Factor 3: Trade specialization

Consumption- and production-based emissions in OECD and BRICS countries in 2018

Country	ba	Production- based emissions		Consumption- based emissions		xports of issions		Production- based emissions		Consumption- based emissions		Net exports of emissions	
	Mt	% of world	Mt	% of world	Mt	% of national emission s	Country	Mt	% of world	Mt	% of world	Mt	% of national emissio ns
OECD, total	12 602	34.6%	13 865	38.1%	-1 264	-10.0%	BRICS, total	15 178	41.7%	13 554	37.2%	1 624	10.7%
Canada	587	1.6%	588	1.6%	-2	-0.3%	Brazil	467	1.3%	489	1.3%	-22	-4.8%
France	332	0.9%	442	1.2%	-110	-33.3%	China	9 957	27.3%	8 960	24.6%	997	10.0%
Germany	755	2.1%	862	2.4%	-106	-14.1%							
Italy	348	1.0%	466	1.3%	-118	-33.8%	India	2 591	7.1%	2 355	6.5%	237	9.1%
Japan	1 136	3.1%	1 312	3.6%	-177	-15.6%	Russia	1 691	4.6%	1 415	3.9%	277	16.4%
Spain	270	0.7%	288	0.8%	-18	-6.6%	South Africa	472	1.3%	335	0.9%	137	29.0%
Sweden	42	0.1%	71	0.2%	-29	-69.5%							
United Kingdom	380	1.0%	540	1.5%	-160	-42.1%							
United States	5 425	14.9%	5 767	15.8%	-343	-6.3%					So	urce: O	ECD

Carbon leakage

- Carbon leakage is the example of spillover effect
- Mechanism: strict emissions regulation in one country increases costs of local producers, as a result their competitiveness relative to foreign producers may decrease
- The most exposed sectors are those that have high carbon intensity and high trade intensity

Carbon leakage exposure of EU economic sectors



Carbon cost

Source: I4CE, 2016

Border carbon adjustment

Idea: to cope with carbon leakage

Mechanism: carbon price should be imposed on the goods imported to the country without any carbon regulation

EU plans: to start carbon border adjustment mechanism in 2022-2023 **Details:** not clear yet

-Sectors (sectors with the largest carbon leakage intensity (trade intensity*emissions intensity): iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, cement?)

-Countries ("all third countries which are not yet part of an effective carbon pricing scheme, or equivalent measures with similar goals and costs to those of the EU ETS")

- -Form (buying allowances at the EU ETS?)
- -Emissions scope (Scope 1?)
- -Part of carbon footprint covered (full emissions or excess over benchmark?)
- -Calculation (for each product or based on the average?)

Potential damage to Russia



Source: ERCST, 2021

Potential damage to Ukraine



Transition risks



Source: CICERO

Transition risks – case for Russia

- Reduction of global demand for fossil fuels (problems of stranded assets)
- Barriers to Russian exports of energy-intensive goods
- Risks of technological backwardness

• Important: most of these risks do not depend on Russia itself directly! Climate policy in the country may be an instrument to manage these risks. At the same time, it may provoke the other types of transition risks

The effects of green transition on Russian energy exports

In any scenario taking into account Paris Agreement, Russian energy exports in 2030 are 20% lower (in energy terms) relative to the *Reference* scenario. By 2050 the corresponding reduction reaches 25% for *INDC* and 64% for *2 degrees*



Russia's exports of fossil fuels, EJ

Source: Makarov et al., 2020

Impacts on the (5-year average) real GDP growth rates



Negative impact of 0.2-0.3 percentage points of GDP growth

- Paris2C RussiaBAU
- Paris2C_RussiaPolicy

More stringent target (consistent with 2C): Additional negative impact of 0.3-0.5 percentage points of GDP growth in 2035-2050

Source: Makarov et al., 2020

Russia's exposure to BCAs is very high

Carbon intensity of exports, kg CO₂ per USD



Key take-aways

- 1. Different countries have different ambitions of climate policies
- 2. Poorer countries, fossil-fuel dependent countries and exporters of energy-intensive goods are usually more reluctant to ambitious climate policies
- 3. Carbon leakage appears as a result of asymmetry of climate policies
- 4. Carbon border adjustment is an attempt to prevent risks of carbon leakage
- 5. Transition risks appear due to climate policies both within a country and outside it

Thanks for your attention e-mail: <u>imakarov@hse.ru</u>