Reforming the EU's fiscal rules: Debt sustainability analysis (DSA) as an anchor

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Philipp Heimberger

Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw)



Reform of EU fiscal rules according to the European Commission orientations: DSAs as an anchor

National ownership embedded in EU framework

- Commission puts forward reference adjustment paths
- Member States propose mediumterm fiscal-structural plans
- Annual budgets will commit to follow the fiscal trajectory and ensure that debt will start converging to prudent levels within the adjustment period
- Member States can request a longer adjustment period underpinned by reforms and investments
- 4. Council endorsement of the plan
- 5. Stronger role of national IFIs

Simplification and focus on fiscal risks

- Net expenditure path
 anchored on debt
 sustainability and agreed by
 Council will be the single
 fiscal indicator
- Surveillance and enforcement will be riskbased
- 3. Debt reduction benchmark, benchmark for reduction in structural balance, significant deviation procedure and matrix of requirements no longer exist

Enforcement


- 1.Deficit-based EDP (3% of GDP threshold) maintained
- 2.Debt-based EDP will be operationalised and strengthened, as a tool to ensure compliance with the agreed net expenditure path
- 3. Financial sanctions toolbox will be enriched with smarter sanctions
- 4. Macroeconomic conditionality will be maintained



Reforming the EU's fiscal rules with DSAs as an anchor

- Four important aspects for upcoming reform debates
 - making judgement calls with regard to DSA assumptions
 - ensuring transparency and democratic legitimacy
 - promoting public investment in the context of climate goals
 - tackling cross-border effects of fiscal policy

Judgement calls: the role of assumptions




Source: European Commission (2022): Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021; own calculations.

Ensuring transparency and democratic legitimacy

- All relevant data and code files should be publicly available
- Debates in the ECON Committee of the European Parliament on the plausibility of the main DSA assumptions
- Commission could approve member states' fiscal-structural plans by delegated act
 - The European Parliament and the European Council would then both have the possibility to overturn the decision within a predetermined period of time
- National parliaments could be involved after the respective government has negotiated expenditure plans with the Commission based on DSA inputs

Public investment has to increase considerably to meet climate targets. Will this be compatible with a focus on falling debt ratios?



Source: European Commission (AMECO).


Output gap (% of potential GDP)

Annual chan

Annual chan

Source: European Commission.

Graph 2.5: Fiscal impulse as measured by net government expenditure growth relative to medium-term potential growth; euro area aggregate



Source: European Commission, own calculations.

Note: The graph shows the difference between net expenditure growth and medium-term potential growth (see glossary); it is multiplied by the share of expenditure in GDP to be expressed in % of GDP. If net expenditure growth exceeds medium-term potential growth, the fiscal impulse is considered expansionary.

Source: European Fiscal Board (2022).


Graph 2.6: Contributions of fiscal impulse

fiscal impulse

-6.0

-8.0

disbursements).



Source: European Commission.

Notes: (1) The group of high-debt countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 90% in Italy, Cyprus and Portugal. Others: the

Conclusions

- The European Commission's power would increase significantly
- Additional safeguards required
 - Transparency and democratic legitimacy
 - Public investment
 - Cross-border effects of fiscal policy
- Importance for CESEE countries
 - Currently lower public debt ratios, but:
 - Additional spending: investment in green industries, ageing population

Thank you for your attention.

e-mail: <u>heimberger@wiiw.ac.at</u>