
Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experiences of Fiscal Federations




## The Sample




**13 federations:** Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, USA















# Central budgets are large in federations, including in decentralized ones...



#### The EU budget is very small...

#### Sources of revenues




- Only 1 percent of GDP, 2 percent of public spending
- Mostly financed by transfers from member states
- Transfers account for two thirds of spending, yet too small to have a stabilizing impact






- 2 What are the institutional arrangements between central and subnational budget authorities?
- 3 What are the financial links between federal and subnational governments, and how have subnational crises been handled, when they occurred?


# Rules are most commonly used as fiscal constraint on subnational governments in federations




# Fiscal constraints on EU Members are complex, yet enforcement mechanisms are relatively less stringent









- Breach Insufficient effort Financial 3 percent Structural effort of 0.5 sanction, closer deficit rule percent of GDP per year surveillance Medium Financial Structural effort of 0.5 term sanction percent of GDP per year objective Financial Reduction of gap by 60 percent sanction, EDP 1/20<sup>th</sup> per year debt rule
- A multi step approach
- Several instances of coordination , yet still incomplete harmonization



- 1 What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence what is the relative size of centralized taxes and outlays?
- 2 What are the institutional arrangements between central and subnational budget authorities?
- ③ What are the financial links between federal and subnational governments, and how have subnational crises been handled, when they occurred?


## In most federations, the central government holds the lion's share of the public debt



#### Distribution of public debt (in percent)

#### SNG CG 100 80 60 40 20 0 Switzerland Australia Germany Canada Metico AUSTIA spain Bratil Beleium JSA

#### Share of SNG debt held by the central government and public entities



#### Experiences of Subnational Debt Crises



Country	Year
Argentina	1992-94
	2001-02
	2003-04
Australia	2009-10
Brazil	1989
	1993
	1997
Germany	1994-2004
India	1980-2012
Mexico	1995
	2004-06
Spain	2012-
South Africa	1997-98
	2011-12
United States	1975
	2006

- 16 episodes
- Rare cases of defaults and restructurings to private creditors
- Permanent crisis resolution framework even less common
- Ad hoc interventions are the norm
- Use of conditionality is frequent

#### The EU setup



- Financial links were minimal before the crisis
  - Transfers: structural funds (½ percent GDP)
  - Indirect financing: EIB
- They have intensified since then
  - Direct support: EFSM, EFSF, ESM (permanent)
  - Indirect support: ECB
- Proposals for shared financial instruments:
  - Direct financing: issuance of common European bonds (euro-bills, redblue bonds, ESBies)
  - Rainy day funds: cyclical adjustment insurance funds financed by national budget contributions

#### Four critical issues for Europe



- Can the EU remain without a central fiscal risk sharing instrument?
- How to make the fiscal governance framework "binding"?
- Is there scope for shared debt instruments?
- Will the crisis resolution lead to closer, or looser, fiscal integration?

## Thank You!

