Second Generation Fiscal Rules: 
Balancing Credibility, Flexibility, and Simplicity

Victor Lledó
Senior Economist, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF
Joint Work with Luc Eyraud, Xavier Debrun, Andrew Hodge, and Catherine Pattillo

JOINT VIENNA INSTITUTE, VIENNA
MAY 7, 2018
Main motivations for the SDN

- Revisiting the case for fiscal rules in light of experience. Rules have been under fire in recent years: too complicated, too rigid, noncredible, unable to curb rising public debts...

- Post-GFC developments. Rapid evolution, a new generation of rules has emerged

- Contribute to the debate. The last Board Paper on fiscal rules dates back to 2009
Main takeaways

- **Fiscal rules have evolved over time**: attempts to combine simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability → simplicity was sacrificed

- **New evidence (econometric and case studies) shows**:
  - Fiscal rules can tame excessive deficits, despite weak legal compliance
  - Enabling factors include a proper design of the rule, supportive institutions, and political buy-in

- **Policy lessons**
  - Adopt a holistic approach to fiscal rule design
  - Tradeoff between flexibility and simplicity can be improved
  - Leveraging reputation costs of breaching a rule more promising than piling up formal sanctions
Outline

I. From First to Second Generation Rules

II. New Empirical Evidence on Rules’ Effectiveness

III. Remaining Challenges

IV. Three Guiding Principles for Future Reforms
I. From First to Second Generation Rules
Main purpose of fiscal rules is to contain excessive deficits

- Fiscal rules
- Commitment device
- Signaling effect
- Political function
- Promote discipline and contain deficit
A Balancing Act

Cyclically-adjusted balance rules, escape clauses

Flexibility

Simplicity
Nominal balance rules

Enforceability
Sanctions, correction mechanisms, fiscal councils
The emergence of a second generation of rules

- More flexible: e.g., escape clauses and flexibility for growth-enhancing reforms
- More enforceable: e.g., correction mechanisms and fiscal councils
- More operational: e.g., expenditure rules
- ...but also more complicated

Source: IMF fiscal rule dataset.
Note: All countries considered in this chart have, at least, one fiscal rule. Rules “corrected for the cycle” include cyclically-adjusted balance rules, structural balance rules, over-the-cycle balance rules, and expenditure rules excluding cyclical items. Total number of countries with at least one fiscal rule are 23, 72, and 92 in 1995, 2005, and 2015 respectively.
Not just a European innovation

- Features introduced in selected countries since 2008:
  - *Escape clauses*: Colombia, Georgia, Jamaica, Tanzania
  - *Correction mechanisms*: Grenada, Mongolia, Panama, Peru
  - *Expenditure rules*: Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay
  - *Independent body monitoring rules*: Chile, Peru, Kenya, Uganda
II. New Empirical Evidence on Rules’ Effectiveness
Taking stock of past experiences with rules

- SDN discusses evidence from the literature and new empirical results in background papers using a global sample
- Effectiveness of rules assessed based on ability to reduce deficits
- Main message: no universal effect of rules on deficits
  - Elusive average effects: “average” rule implemented in “average” country seems ineffective (after correcting for endogeneity)
  - Effectiveness depends on (i) the design of rules and (ii) the context in which they are implemented → effectiveness varies across rules and countries (heterogeneity)
Different impacts across rules

Sweden: General Government Finances Following Rule Adoption, 1992-2016
(Percent of GDP)

- Broad economic and institutional coverage
- Builds buffers in good times
- Good calibration
- Well-designed escape clauses
- Supporting institutions (correction mechanisms and fiscal councils)
- Sound PFM and political buy-in

Introduction of the expenditure ceiling

Source: Sixth Background Paper by Mbaye and Ture.
Different impacts across countries

- Rules affect countries with low and high fiscal balances in opposite directions
- The rule’s threshold acts as a magnet
- Over time, fiscal aggregates move closer to the threshold

Source: Third Background Paper by Caselli and Wingender.
III. Remaining Challenges
1. Combining rules causes headaches

- **Overlap** between rules (creates operational and political economy problems)
- **Inconsistency** between rules’ ceilings
- **Overdetermined** systems (leads to suboptimal policies)
- **Lack of credibility**

---

**Pitfalls of multiple rules**

![Average Number of Rules per Country](chart)

- **EU**
- **Non-EU**
- **Total**

Source: IMF fiscal rule dataset.

Note: Based on a constant country sample (including countries with no rule at some point during the period).
2. Flexibility creates complexity

Real-Time Underestimation of the Output Gap in Europe
(In ppts; 2003-16)

Source: AMECO database (ex post data), and stability programs (real time estimates).
3. Compliance remains low

1/ Average frequency for all types of budget balance rules in force between 1985-2016 (all years, all countries).
IV. Three Guiding Principles for Future Reforms
1. A holistic approach to rule-based frameworks

- Fiscal frameworks should be designed and reformed as a whole
- Frameworks should be reviewed periodically

Criteria for “good” systems of rules:

- Anchoring
- Parsimony
- Consistency
2. Flexibility made simpler

Alternative approaches to flexibility

- Expenditure growth rules often strike a better balance between simplicity and flexibility
- Flexibility provisions should be more prevalent. Design matters to avoid abuse!

Source: IMF Fiscal Rule Dataset.
3. Better compliance through stronger incentives

- Higher costs for noncompliers
  - Limited effectiveness of sanctions
  - Better to magnify reputational costs

- More tangible benefits for compliers
  - Lower financing costs?
  - Create new carrots in supranational settings
## Tailoring the three principles to country circumstances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Advanced Economies</th>
<th>Emerging Markets</th>
<th>Low Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holistic approach</td>
<td>Reduce the number of rules</td>
<td>Achieve greater consistency across rules and calibrate debt rule properly</td>
<td>Adopt two-pillar framework with debt anchor and operational rule(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Review costs/benefits of cyclically-adjusted balance rules</td>
<td>Place more emphasis on expenditure rules</td>
<td>Use well-designed escape clauses and promote self-insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Rely on fiscal councils to facilitate enforcement</td>
<td>Fiscal transparency (comprehensive, clear, timely reporting)</td>
<td>Sound budgeting practices and data quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion
Getting the design right

- Empirical evidence suggests that rules can be effective at containing excessive deficits under specific conditions.

- Design matters: existing rules have become too complicated and some are counterproductive.

- The next frontier is to achieve flexibility and enforceability without sacrificing simplicity. Greater reliance on expenditure rules suggests that it is possible.

- Key role of supporting institutions (e.g., fiscal councils and PFM systems).

- Fiscal frameworks should be reformed in a holistic manner.